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Abstract 
The Joint Planning and Development Office 
(JPDO), is charged by Congress with developing 
the concepts and plans for the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) [1].  The 
National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (NASSP), 
developed by the Safety Working Group of the 
JPDO, focuses on establishing the goals, objectives, 
and strategies needed to realize the safety objectives 
of the NextGen Integrated Plan. 
The three goal areas of the NASSP are Safer 
Practices, Safer Systems, and Safer Worldwide.  
Safer Practices emphasizes an integrated, 
systematic approach to safety risk management 
through implementation of formalized Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) that incorporate safety 
data analysis processes, and the enhancement of 
methods for ensuring safety is an inherent 
characteristic of NextGen.  Safer Systems 
emphasizes implementation of safety-enhancing 
technologies, which will improve safety for human-
centered interfaces and enhance the safety of 
airborne and ground-based systems.  Safer 
Worldwide encourages coordinating the adoption 
of the safer practices and safer systems 
technologies, policies and procedures worldwide, 
such that the maximum level of safety is achieved 
across air transportation system boundaries. 
This paper introduces the NASSP and its 
development, and focuses on the Safer Systems 
elements of the NASSP, which incorporates three 
objectives for NextGen systems: 1) provide risk 
reducing system interfaces, 2) provide safety 
enhancements for airborne systems, and 3) provide 
safety enhancements for ground-based systems.  
The goal of this paper is to expose avionics and air 
traffic management system developers to NASSP 
objectives and Safer Systems strategies. 
National Aviation Safety Strategic 
Plan 
Background 
The United States’ Air Transportation System 
(ATS) facilitates the safe and efficient movement of 
people and goods around the globe and serves as a 
critical economic engine for the nation.  The 
existing ATS is reaching the limits of its potential 
for growth and it is not scalable to safely 
accommodate future demand [2].  Improvements 
are needed to safely accommodate increasing 
demand.  Failure to accommodate this growing 
demand in the years ahead will result in costly 
delays throughout the system and compromise the 
Country’s ability to create jobs and economic 
growth. 
In 1997, the National Civil Aviation Review 
Commission’s (NCARC) report, A Consensus for 
Change, stated that the current course of the air 
transportation system will impair our domestic 
economy, reduce our standing in the global 
marketplace, and result in a long-term deterioration 
of aviation safety.  One major recommendation of 
the Commission was that the FAA and the aviation 
industry develop a strategic plan to improve safety, 
with specific priorities based on objective, 
quantitative analysis of safety information and data.  
The Commission reported that problems with the 
air transportation system can be rectified, but will 
take dramatic change. 
In 2003, President George W. Bush and 
Congress took a significant step toward 
transforming the air transportation system with the 
enactment of the VISION 100 – Century of 
Aviation Reauthorization Act.  The VISION 100 
Act established a mandate for the Next Generation 
Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiative to 
achieve the goals of accommodating a significant 
increase in demand for air transportation, 
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accommodate all users, and improve aviation 
safety.  To manage these efforts, the VISION 100 
Act created the Joint Planning and Development 
Office (JPDO) – a unique, cooperative partnership 
between public and private stakeholders.  The 
JPDO represents the aviation interests of the 
Department of Transportation (DOT), Department 
of Defense (DoD), Department of Commerce 
(DOC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) and industry 
stakeholders.  The Next Generation Air 
Transportation System Integrated Plan, the first 
product of this groundbreaking effort, was delivered 
by the JPDO to Congress in December 2004 [1]. 
The JPDO Senior Policy Committee is chaired 
by the Secretary of Transportation and includes 
senior executives representing the Federal entities 
that make up the JPDO.  The Committee oversees 
JPDO work, including NextGen plan development, 
and is responsible for execution of NextGen 
strategies and plans by the departments, agencies, 
or offices its members lead or represent.  Among its 
key activities, the Committee works to provide 
policy guidance, resolve major policy issues, and 
identify and align resource needs.  The Senior 
Policy Committee is responsible for approving the 
National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (NASSP) as 
a supplement to the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System Integrated Plan. 
In addition to responding to the social, 
economic, political, and technological changes that 
are evolving worldwide, the transformation to 
NextGen must meet the country’s air transportation 
safety, security, mobility, efficiency, and capacity 
needs.  The JPDO is charged with developing the 
concepts, architectures, roadmaps and 
implementation plans for transforming the current 
national air transportation system into the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System.  Upon 
adoption by the Senior Policy Committee of the 
JPDO, the member departments and agencies will 
be charged with incorporating these products into 
their plans. 
Safety Working Group 
The JPDO Safety Working Group is tasked 
with developing products and plans for achieving 
the NextGen safety goals.  The JPDO Safety 
Working Group chartered a Strategic Planning 
Standing Committee, comprised of public and 
private stakeholders, to develop the NASSP.  The 
NASSP provides strategies for achieving NextGen 
safety goals through practice, procedure, and 
system improvements implemented domestically 
and coordinated worldwide.  The NASSP defines 
the objectives, strategies and work areas for 
aviation safety improvements, that will ensure 
aviation safety increases are commensurate with the 
growing demands on the air transportation system.  
When adopted by the JPDO, member agencies and 
departments, through the OMB, will align their 
aviation safety research, development, and 
implementation plans to the NASSP. 
Three Goal Areas 
The NASSP is organized by its three goal 
areas: Safer Practices, Safer Systems, and Safer 
Worldwide. 
Safer Practices emphasizes an integrated, 
systematic approach to safety risk management 
through implementation of formalized Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) that incorporate safety 
data analysis processes and the enhancement of 
methods for ensuring safety is an inherent 
characteristic of NextGen.  The objectives of safer 
practices are to provide consistent safety 
management approaches that are implemented 
throughout government and industry; to provide 
enhanced monitoring and safety analysis of the air 
transportation system; and to provide enhanced 
methods for ensuring safety is an inherent 
characteristic of NextGen. 
Safer Systems emphasizes implementation of 
safety-enhancing technologies, which will improve 
safety for human-centered interfaces and enhance 
the safety of airborne and ground-based systems.  
The objectives of safer systems are to provide risk 
reducing systems interfaces; to provide safety 
enhancements for airborne systems; and to provide 
safety enhancements for ground-based systems. 
Safer Worldwide provides strategies for 
coordinating the adoption of technologies, policies, 
and procedures worldwide such that safety 
improvements are commensurate with increases in 
demand to achieve the maximum level of safety 
across air transportation system boundaries.  The 
objectives of safer worldwide are to encourage 
development and implementation of safer practices 
and safer systems worldwide and to establish 
equivalent levels of safety across air transportation 
system boundaries. 
Development and Substantiation 
The NASSP was developed and vetted by the 
JPDO partner departments and agencies and 
through close collaboration with subject matter 
experts and industry stakeholders.  This plan is a 
living document that the JPDO will maintain, 
review, and update on an annual basis.  This will 
ensure that the appropriate safety focus is 
maintained and the most effective safety 
management approaches and technologies are 
identified, assessed, and implemented. 
Development of the NASSP began with the 
top-down identification of safety goals and 
objectives by safety subject matter experts 
participating as members of the JPDO Safety 
Working Group’s Strategic Planning Standing 
Committee.  NASSP strategies supporting the 
objectives were similarly derived.  Substantiation of 
the NASSP strategies included the gathering of 
critical safety issues from aviation stakeholders 
worldwide, and surveying aviation safety subject 
matter experts to determine the priority of the safety 
issues and the NASSP strategies, and rating the 
applicability of the NASSP strategies to the safety 
issues.  Multidimensional preference and statistical 
analyses of the ranking and rating data provided a 
basis for refinement of the NASSP, and for 
demonstrating compliance with the NCARC 
recommendation for a national plan based on 
objective, quantitative analysis of safety 
information and data. 
Safer Systems Goal 
Aviation system technologies for safety are 
aimed at managing hazards, eliminating recurring 
accidents, and mitigating accident and incident 
consequences.  NextGen operational requirements 
for both ground-based and airborne systems will 
lead to the implementation of advanced 
technologies with improved capabilities in all NAS 
domains, including the following: communication, 
navigation, and surveillance; air traffic 
management; vehicle systems; manufacturing 
methods; vehicle and ground systems health 
management; maintenance; and human-centered 
interfaces for air and ground systems.  The 
integration of safety-derived requirements and 
safety-specific functions and technologies within all 
NextGen domains, as well as the implementation of 
safety-focused systems will be required for the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System to achieve its 
safety goals. 
The eight NextGen key capabilities: Network-
Enabled Information Access, Performance-Based 
Operations and Services, Weather-Assimilated 
Decision-Making, Layered Adaptive Security, 
Broad-Area Precision Navigation, Aircraft 
Trajectory-Based Operations, Equivalent Visual 
Operations, and Super Density Operations, will 
each require implementing new systems.  The 
systems that enable key capabilities will be 
comprised of multiple interfaces between hardware, 
software, people, facilities, and procedures.  These 
elements will be organized to accomplish common 
objectives.  Integrating safety into the NextGen key 
capabilities will require development of specific 
safety-related requirements for the capabilities. 
Objective 1: Provide Risk Reducing System 
Interfaces 
For the time epoch of this plan, the overall 
safety and efficiency of the air transportation 
system will depend upon human operators as the 
ultimate integrators of the numerous space, air, and 
ground elements.  Understanding and accounting 
for the role of humans, and their positive and 
potentially negative contributions, will be important 
to maintaining and improving safety, while also 
improving efficiency.  While data exist on human 
error, empirical data on humans’ positive 
contributions are lacking.  A review of aviation 
accidents indicates that human error continues to be 
a primary contributing factor in commercial, public-
use, and general aviation accidents [3-5].  However, 
numerous events can be cited where humans found 
and successfully compensated for a wide variety of 
vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in design, 
implementation, training, procedures, and 
operations.  The human is able to react to unknowns 
and unexpected events by applying experience, 
learned skills, innovation, and general knowledge 
[6]. 
In many cases, these errors resulted from 
failures in the transfer or communication of critical 
information [7].  Typical failures include operator 
misinterpretation of information presented by 
automated systems or in written guidance, 
unfamiliarity with systems or information, failure to 
monitor the systems state, or miscommunication 
between key operators.  Automation, if not 
designed and trained properly, can increase the 
chances for human error [8-9]. 
Human cognitive processing capability, 
communication, and coordination must be 
supported.  One key element is situation awareness.  
Situation awareness includes the state of awareness, 
which encompasses an accurate perception of 
elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space (the situation), an accurate 
comprehension of their meaning, and the ability to 
make an accurate projection of their status [10]  and 
the process of achieving this state of awareness.  
Some cognitive processing activities critical to 
dynamic, event-driven, and multi-task decisions, 
such as those required of pilots, controllers, and 
dispatchers, include sensory perception, memory, 
attention, and categorization.  To respond 
adequately and efficiently, to make productive 
decisions, and to communicate effectively, it is 
essential that the operator have an accurate 
awareness of their situation. 
Therefore, a primary consideration in the 
design of risk reducing systems is to increase 
operator situation awareness across a host of 
dimensions, defined by the goals and decision tasks 
for a particular operator’s job.  For pilots, this might 
include temporal and spatial positioning, as well as 
an acute awareness of the system state, limits, and 
future sequences.  In nominal conditions, greater 
awareness of systems health will help to prevent 
accidents through actions taken by operators to 
ensure that operational demands do not exceed 
system capabilities.  In off-nominal conditions, 
operators and maintainers will be able to mitigate 
the consequences of a failure or undesirable system 
state through timely responses in intervening, 
managing and restoring full system capabilities.  
Especially in the presence of partial system failures, 
both operators and maintainers will need an 
accurate awareness of systems health, for both 
aircraft and air traffic management systems.  
Systems designed to increase situation awareness 
will provide operators with relevant information in 
an accessible, understandable, and usable format. 
This objective focuses on effective and safe 
systems interfaces that improve individual and 
collaborative situation awareness, information 
management, and decision-making.  It includes 
human-to-human, human-to-automation and 
automation-to-automation interfaces.  It emphasizes 
the exchange and presentation of information, the 
means to obtain information for sound decision-
making, and the appropriate role of humans, human 
interaction, and automation in the future’s highly 
automated systems needed to accomplish the 
NextGen goals.  Though the primary focus will be 
on systems interfaces for the front-line operator 
(e.g. pilot, controller, maintenance technician, and 
security personnel), the same concepts extend to the 
larger population of users of information whose 
decisions directly or indirectly affect the front-line 
operator.  The following four strategies will be 
adopted in the development and implementation of 
risk reducing systems interfaces.     
Ensure the availability and accessibility of 
required information, to include providing and 
assuring the continuity of critical information and 
limiting the manipulation required for operator 
access.  Increase the usefulness and 
understandability of information, such that 
priority is given to critical information, that it is 
presented in a clear and concise manner, and is 
grouped and ordered in a consistent and logical 
sequence.  Available, accessible, useful, and 
understandable information will be instrumental in 
decreasing operator confusion and increasing 
appropriate, timely, and accurate decision-making. 
To meet demands for capacity and safety, the 
current trend toward automated systems with 
increased capabilities will continue.  However, 
developing and implementing these systems 
responsibly will require maintaining appropriate 
human engagement.  System designers must 
consider the limits of human performance in both 
nominal and off-nominal conditions to secure and 
maintain the operator’s attention without exceeding 
their ability to interact and process.  When system 
degradation prompts an automated reversion to 
lower system performance limits, automation-to-
automation design integrity is critical.  An 
appropriate allocation of human versus automation 
functions will decrease the possibility for authority-
responsibility double binds where the human is 
responsible for the tedious monitoring of highly 
reliable automation, will allow the operator to 
successfully attend to and satisfy the most pressing 
tasks, and will provide the operator with a coherent 
set of tasks supported by reliable automated 
functions. 
NextGen operational concepts will require 
more effective and efficient communication and 
collaboration between pilots, controllers, dispatch, 
and maintenance personnel, especially during off-
nominal events.  Therefore, improve operational 
decision aids, by developing decision-aiding 
automation for airborne and ground-based systems 
that assists appropriate operator interaction and 
intervention.  A key component of developing 
decision-aiding interfaces is identifying the best 
methods to communicate critical information, and 
standardizing the training of these methods and 
required interactions.  Improving operational 
decision aids and the communication of critical 
information in a timely and effective manner will 
help to reduce communication errors, decrease 
decision errors, and ultimately improve response to 
unforeseen events on the system. 
Objective 2: Provide Safety Enhancements for 
Airborne Systems 
In the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System, airborne systems will become an 
increasingly integral part of the overall air traffic 
management system.  The JPDO Concept of 
Operations for the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System [11] proposes to include 
aircraft as interactive nodes on an air traffic 
management network under the Network Enabled 
Operations concept.  It also identifies several key 
capabilities, such as Aircraft Trajectory-Based 
Operations, Equivalent Visual Operations, and 
Super Density Operations that will require aircraft 
automation systems to carry out functions that 
today are performed by air traffic control systems.  
Likewise, pilots, whether onboard, remote, or 
automated, will be required to take on 
responsibilities traditionally performed by air traffic 
controllers.  To increase system throughput, 
reductions in aircraft spacing (longitudinal, lateral, 
and/ or vertical) in all operational phases of flight 
(including the ground phase) will be required.  To 
minimize the risk of aircraft collisions and wake 
vortex encounters, barriers to reduced separation 
will be addressed, to include performance limits of 
communications, navigation, and surveillance 
systems. 
This objective focuses on integrating safety 
requirements into the development and 
implementation of capacity-enhancing 
advancements for aircraft, to maintain or improve 
safety as capacity is increased.  The following five 
strategies will be adopted in the development and 
implementation of airborne systems. 
Improve the reliability and airworthiness of 
aircraft, through increased reliability of control, 
avionics, software, and information management 
systems, as well as the long-term structural 
airworthiness of new materials and advanced 
aircraft designs.  The result will be reduced systems 
failures and reduced diversions or incomplete 
missions. 
Improve vehicle systems health 
management through advanced monitoring 
systems and decision aids.  These systems can 
monitor all aspects of systems health, both during 
flight and through post-flight analysis, including 
vehicle structures, propulsion systems, control 
system elements, and avionics hardware and 
software.  To provide pilots, dispatchers and 
maintenance personnel with ready access to system 
health information, advanced aircraft monitoring 
systems will be developed that integrate sensor 
information.  Integration of advanced monitoring 
systems will increase operators’ timely and accurate 
understanding of system health, resulting in quicker 
identification of sub-system faults and failures and 
increased opportunity to successfully mitigate and 
prevent these failures.  Enhanced decision aids will 
assist operators in preventing unacceptable safety 
risks from developing, enhancing operators’ 
recognition and incorporation of complex factors in 
situation assessment and mitigative decision-
making.  To ensure an efficient response, certain 
system failures will precipitate automatic transition 
to alternate operating parameters, with backup 
procedures in the event of anomalous conditions.  
Executing this strategy will help to reduce the 
number of hazards encountered, enhance the 
understanding of off-nominal conditions, and 
reduce the response time in making optimal 
decisions, ultimately improving operator awareness 
and mitigative response to airborne events and 
hazards. 
Increase the reliability and accuracy of data 
and information by implementing strict controls 
on the acquisition and processing of information 
critical for air crew response in both nominal and 
off-nominal operating conditions.  The data 
acquisition process must ensure the integrity of data 
through quality checking for displayed data and for 
the execution of automated programming, 
especially those supporting automated reversion 
functions and automation-to-automation interfaces.  
Timeliness of data is critical to maintaining data 
accuracy and integrity for time-critical decisions.  
These controls will become increasingly important 
as aircraft are more highly integrated in the air 
traffic management system.  This strategy will help 
to lower instances of system degradation caused by 
data latency, faults, and/ or failures, and increase air 
crew confidence in the use of and reliance on the 
data. 
Ensure aircraft conformance to more 
stringent operations requirements; achieving 
many NextGen capacity gains will require a higher 
level of performance in some aspects of navigation, 
guidance and control, especially for reduced-
separation and trajectory-based operations.  In 
meeting these requirements, careful examination 
must also be made that other causes of deviations 
from assigned flight trajectories will not increase 
the potential for near miss and collision incidents 
and accidents, or to runway incursions. 
While it is preferable to prevent rather than 
mitigate the consequences of aircraft accidents, 
ultimately, it is not possible to prevent all accidents, 
across all sectors of aviation, under all operating 
conditions.  Therefore, work must be undertaken to 
increase aircraft system contributions to survival 
in crash scenarios, with systems and technologies 
designed to mitigate the consequences and hazards 
associated with accidents, such as post-crash fires, 
toxic fumes, and impact loads.  This will help to 
reduce fatalities and severe injuries from the levels 
sustained in accidents today. 
Objective 3: Provide Safety Enhancements for 
Ground-Based Systems 
NextGen concepts, such as Network Enabled 
Operations, Aircraft Trajectory-Based Operations, 
and Super-Density Operations, require the 
integration of ground-based and airborne systems, 
and the introduction of collaborative air traffic 
control functions.  Associated ground-based system 
safety enhancements must mitigate the risks 
associated with new or changing operational 
concepts.  Considering the appropriate level of 
automation and human performance limits will be 
critical to maintaining air transportation system 
safety.  Ground-based support elements, such as 
aircraft and air traffic management maintenance 
systems, as well as airport infrastructure, must 
evolve to support the proposed capacity enhancing 
concepts of NextGen.  
This objective focuses on increasing the level 
of safety with the advancement of ground-based 
systems to meet complex operational demands from 
an increasingly complex set of air transportation 
users.  In addition to the community of commercial, 
general aviation, rotorcraft, public-use, and military 
air transportation system users, additional users will 
include both unmanned aircraft and space vehicle 
operators.  The following four strategies will be 
adopted to assure safety in the development and 
implementation of ground-based systems. 
Improve ground-based systems health 
management through advanced monitoring 
systems and decision aids.  NextGen concepts will 
require new levels of automation in air traffic, 
maintenance, and other ground-based systems.  
These systems will be designed to meet increased 
demands during nominal operations and maintain 
integrity at degraded performance levels in off-
nominal conditions.  Operators of ground-based 
systems should have a clear understanding of the 
internal and external factors that affect their 
operation.  The concomitant, relevant performance 
limits of the system must be respected to maintain 
safety.  To improve operator awareness, advanced 
monitoring systems will continuously communicate 
system state information and detect system faults 
and failures.  Integration of advanced monitoring 
systems will increase key operators’ timely and 
accurate understanding of system health, resulting 
in quicker identification of system failures and 
increased opportunity for their successful mitigation 
and prevention.  Enhanced decision aids will be 
developed to assist operators in preventing 
unacceptable safety risks from developing.  They 
will enhance operator recognition and incorporation 
of complex factors in situation assessment and in 
decision-making.  As with aircraft systems, 
maintaining the appropriate level of automation and 
human engagement will be critical.  To ensure an 
efficient response, certain system failures will 
initiate automatic transition to alternate operating 
parameters, with backup procedures in the event of 
anomalous conditions.  Executing this strategy will 
help to improve operator awareness and mitigative 
response to events and hazards  by reducing the 
number of hazards encountered, enhancing the 
understanding of off-nominal conditions, and  
reducing the response time required to make 
optimal decisions. 
Increase the reliability and accuracy of 
ground-based systems data and information by 
implementing strict controls on the acquisition and 
processing of information critical for ground-based 
system response in both nominal and off-nominal 
operating conditions.  The data acquisition process 
must ensure the integrity of data through quality 
checking for displayed data and for the execution of 
automated programming, especially those 
supporting automated reversion functions and 
automation-to-automation interfaces.  Timeliness of 
data is critical to maintaining data accuracy and 
integrity for time-critical decisions.  These controls 
will become increasingly important as the air 
transportation system becomes more highly 
integrated.  This strategy will help to lower 
instances of system degradation caused by data 
latency, faults, and/ or failures, and increase users’ 
confidence in the use of and reliance on ground-
based systems. 
Ensure ground-based system conformance 
to more stringent operations requirements; 
implementing NextGen capacity enhancing 
concepts will require a higher level of accuracy and 
complexity in ground-based systems in 
collaborating with advanced aircraft systems.  
Future ground systems will be designed to meet the 
requirements of reduced separation and trajectory-
based operations.  Strict conformance to these 
requirements will result in fewer deviations from 
assigned flight trajectories, fewer near miss and 
collision incidents and accidents, and fewer runway 
incursions. 
As aircraft and air traffic system reliability has 
improved, the work associated with aviation safety 
has turned from mitigation of accidents and their 
consequences to their prevention.  However, it is 
not possible to prevent all aviation accidents.  We 
must increase ground-based system contributions 
to survival in crash scenarios by implementing 
advanced emergency detection capabilities, 
response methods, and airport infrastructure that 
minimize the effects of both runway excursions and 
off-site landings.  These advancements will play a 
key role in the reduction of the severity of 
accidents, and provide a more timely and effective 
emergency response, leading to fewer fatalities and 
less severe injuries than those sustained in accidents 
today. 
Conclusion 
The National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan 
defines national goals, objectives, and strategies for 
improving aviation safety commensurate with the 
growing demands on the air transportation system.  
The plan was developed and vetted by the JPDO 
partner departments and agencies and through close 
collaboration with subject matter experts and 
industry stakeholders, and is a living document that 
the JPDO will maintain, review, and update on an 
annual basis. 
The Safer Systems goal supports NextGen 
operational improvements for both ground-based 
and airborne systems that will require 
implementation of advanced technologies with 
improved capabilities in all NAS domains.  These 
domains include communication, navigation, and 
surveillance; air traffic management; vehicle 
systems; manufacturing methods; vehicle and 
ground systems health management; maintenance; 
and human-centered interfaces for air and ground 
systems.  The integration of safety-derived 
requirements and safety-specific functions and 
technologies within all NextGen domains, as well 
as the implementation of safety-focused systems 
will be required for NextGen to achieve its safety 
goals. 
Safer Systems is only one part of the plan, 
however.  Systems are implemented in conjunction 
with operational procedures and supported by 
training.  The Safer Practices goal area of the 
NASSP provides additional objectives and 
strategies associated with managing safety within 
NextGen, while the Safer Worldwide goal 
acknowledges the global nature of aviation and 
promotes coordinating safety across national and 
modal boundaries.  The JPDO’s Integrated Work 
Plan safety elements reflect the organizational 
structure of the NASSP and provide additional 
detail on specific safety related aspects of NextGen 
operational improvements, enablers, and R&D 
actions needed to realize NextGen safety goals. 
The NASSP is expected to complete JPDO 
agency review in September 2008, after which it 
will be presented to the JPDO Board and 
subsequently to the JPDO Senior Policy Committee 
for approval.  Once approved, its goals will become 
the NextGen safety goals; the Joint Planning and 
Development Office (JPDO) member departments 
and agencies will plan their aviation safety 
resources to support its objectives, and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) will use it to align 
agency budgets relative to aviation safety. 
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